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WAR ON BILATERAL TREATIEs-

STUDY-The effect of war upon existing bilateral
treaties of belligerents is one of the unsettled problems of international
law. The problem is to determine whether a bilateral treaty (between
nations at peace) which does not provide for the eventuality of war,
will be suspended or annulled by a subsequent war between them.
The idea that war is a complete destruction of the international ·intercourse which was represented by the treaty logically would lead to
the conclusion that the treaty ends ipso facto when war comes. But
this is too hasty a conclusion; international practice proves that some
treaties are only suspended, some abrogated, while others remain
in force. 1
CoMPARATIVE

1 For general information on the subject see: ANznorn, Couns DB DROIT
lm:BRNATIONAL (Gidel's translation) vol. I, pp. 447-456 (Paris, 1929); M. BuoNVINO,
Gu BFFB'ITI DBI.LA GUBRRI SULLA VALIDITA Dm TRAn'ATI (Aquila, 1912); A. VON
BURGSDOBFF, Dms KmllGSERKI.ARUNG UND IHRE Wnm:UNGEN UNTI!R BESONDBRER
BBRUCXSICHTIGUNG DER OFFENTLICH-RECBTLICBBN UND PRIVATRECHTLICHEN VllRTRAGB
(Diisseldorf, 1914); Cavagliegi, "Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix," Hague
Academy, RBCUBIL DB Couns, vol. 26, pp. 531-534 (1929); F10RE, OOBRNATIONAL
LAw (Borchard's translation, 1918) ,r845; 5 HACKWORTH, DIG:asT OF lm:BRNATIONAL
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The authors are not in agreement. The older writers like Vattel,2
Martens3 or Mably,4 said that treaties ended when war broke out,5
but modern authorities have rejected these sweeping statements. Some
have held that in case nothing is said about war in the treaty itself,6
the effect of hostilities upon the treaty provisions depends upon the
interpretation of the intention of the parties.7 Others, such as Mr.
Politis, declared that international law neither maintains nor annuls
treaties regardless of the effect produced, but only establishes standards
so that the provisions compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated, will be enforced, and those incompatible rejected. 8
Following the doctrine enunciated by Vattel and others,9 the
practice of the eighteenth century1° was to consider that all kinds of
treaties were annulled by war. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century the United States Supreme Court handed down the famous
case of Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven. 11
LAw §513 (1943); HAu., !NrERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., c. x, P· 453 (1927);
Sir Cecil Hurst, ''The Effect of War on Treaties," 2 BRITISH YEA:RBooK OF lNTERNATIONAL LAw 37-47 (1921-22); R. JAcOMET, LA GUERRE ET LES TRAITES (these,
Poitiers, 1909); J. R. Keely, "The Effect of the End of War on Pre-War Treaties Between
the Belligerents," TRANSACTIONS oF THE GRonus SocmTY, 1927, pp. 7-17; McNAIR,
THE LAw oF TREATIES 530-552 (1938); 5 MooRE, DIGEST OF lNTERNATIONAL LAw 383
(1906); 2 OPPBNHBIM, lNTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., §99, pp. 253-255 (1944); Orfield,
''The Effect of War on Treaties," 11 NEB. LAw BtJL. 276 (1933); PHILLIMORB, lNTERNATIONAL LAw, 3d ed., vol. 2, p. 30 and vol. 3, p. 792 (1882); N. Politis, "Effets de la
guerre sur obligations intemationales et les contrats prlves," ANNaAIRB DB L'lNsTITUT DB
DnoIT lNTERNATIONAL, 1910, p. 251 et seq., 1911, p. 200 et seq., 1912, p. 611 et seq.;
RoussBAu, TRAIT.B DB DnoIT !NrERNA'l'IONAL PuBLic, t. I, p. 554 et seq. (1944); SCBLLE,
Couns DB DROIT lNTERNA'l'IONAL PUBLIC, pp. 659-660 (1948).
2
3

VATTBL, LB DROIT DBS GBNs, 1758, Book II, c. XII, 'iI153 and '11192.
G. F. DB MAllTBNs, PRBcrs DU DRoIT DBS GENS MODERNB DE L'EunoPE., 4th ed.,
,i5s (1820).
4MABLY, DRoIT PUBLIC DE L'EunoPE, vol. 1, p. 206 (1748).
5 See also a Spanish decree of April 24, 1898, declaring in its First Article that all
treaties between the United States and Spain were abrogated by war. REVUE GENBRALB
DB DnoIT mTERNATIONAL PuBLic, 1898, p. 762, in note; GACBTA DB MADRID, April 24,
1898.
6 Rapisardi-Mirabelli, "Theorie generale des Unions Intemationales," Hague Academy,
REcUBIL DB Couns, vol. 7, p. 384 (1925).
7 Hurst, note 1 supra; 2 HYDE, lNTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed., p. 1546 et seq., 'll'il547
to 551 (1945); McNair, "La temination et la dissolution des traites," Hague Academy,
REcUBIL DB Couns, vol. 22, 511-512 (1928).
8 N. Politis, ''Effets de la guerre sur les obligations intemationales et les contrats
prives," (Report to the Institute of International Law), ANNaAIRB DB L'lNsTITUT DB DnoIT
!NrERNATIONAL, 1910, p. 521 et seq., 1911, p. 200 et seq., 1912, p. 611 et seq.; see also
for an early writer, BLUNTsCHLI, DAS MoDERN VoLKBRRECHT DER CmLismTBN STATEN,
3d ed., 'i{538, p. 302 and 'iI718, p. 402 (1878).
9 See notes 2, 3, 4 supra.
lO McNair, "La Termination et la Dissolution des Traites," Hague Academy, REcumL
DB Couns, vol. 22, p. 529 (1928) and the LAw oF TREATIES 533 (1938). See Featherstonbaugh v. Boffi, (1854) Sirey (hereinafter cited as S.) 1854.1.811.
11 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 464 (1823).
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In the course of its opinion the Court said: 'We think ... that treaties
stipulating for permanent rights, and general arrangements, and professing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as well
as of peace, do not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, at most,
only suspended while it lasts; and unless they are waived by the
parties, or new and repugnant stipulations are made, they revive in
their operation at the return of peace."12 This was the first expression
of the idea that the duties of a treaty which are not necessarily suspended by war subsist in their full force. The decision in the above
case exercised a great influence at the time, and some decisions along
the same line were handed down in France13 and England.14 It also
greatly affected a theory which gained wide influence almost a century
later when Mr. Politis1 5 expounded with great force the American
idea in a report presented in 1911 to the International Law Institute.
In the international field, the Permanent Court of Arbitration applied
the same idea in a very important decision.16
Nevertheless, most of the courts in Europe during World War I
and World War II held that war annulled treaties of whatever kind
except those dealing with conditions during hostilities. War was considered as a revolutionary crisis which put in question the entire
positive law. In other words, these courts viewed war as an extreme
method of revision of the legal, social, and political world, and therefore
it is easy to understand that on a logical basis treaties regulating these
matters could not remain in force. 17 On the other hand, the American
court decisions always maintained the necessity of distinguishing between treaties incompatible with the state of war, which were abrogated,
and treaties which are not incompatible and therefore were kept in
full force.18
12 Id. at 494.
13 Aix, 8 Dec. 1858 (Isnard Blanc v. Pezzales)
14 BISHOP, hrrERNATIONAL LAw, c. VII, p. 64

S. 1859.2.606.
(1951); Sutton v. Sutton, 1 Russ. &

My. 663, 39 Eng. Rep. 255 (1830).
15 See note 8 supra.
16 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, September 7, 1910, J.B. Scott, The Hague
Court Reports, p. 141 (1916); see also J. Basdevant, "L'aliaire des pecheries des clltes
septentrionales de l'Atlantique," 19, REVUE GBNERALE DB DnoIT lNTBRNATIONAL PUBLIC
421 especially at 423-425 (1912).
17 Lyon, 13 Oct. 1921, JoURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 391 (1923); Cass. (It.)
26 Jan., 1929, llivISTA DI DmITTO lNTBRNAZIONALB, vol. 21, pp. 418-420 (1929);
Germany, May 23, 1925, ENTscHBIDUNGBN DBS REicHSGBRICHTs IN ZlvILsACHBN, 1926,
vol. 111, p. 40, and ZBITSCHRIFT FUR lNTBRNATIONALBs REcHT 408 (1926).
1s Carneal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 181 (1825); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y.
222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920), cert. den. 254 U.S. 643. The Sophie Rickmers, (D.C.
N.Y. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 413, commented upon 29 MicH. L. REv. 947 (1931); State ex rel.
Miner v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 P. 158 (1926); Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750, 223
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The confusion among the courts in France was great. Influenced
by the American line of decisions, some French courts decided that
whether the stipulations of a treaty or the treaty as a whole is annulled
by the war depended upon their intrinsic character.19 The bulk of
the decisions, however, came after the declaration of war by Italy on
France in 1940. They dealt with the question of whether the "Convention on Establishment of Italians in France" (a convention giving
gratuitously and without a requirement of reciprocity to Italian citizens
resident in France the same treatment as French citizens were entitled
to in matters concerning the enjoyment of private rights) was abrogated
by war.20
Some courts held that the convention was not terminated by war
and other courts held that it was. This difference of opinion had to be
settled because of the great importance of the question involved.
Unfortunately, on appeal to the Court of _Cassation, the Supreme
Court of France, the accidents of procedure brought it before two of
the several chambers.21 Here the confusion increased. The "Chambre
Sociale"22 held that conventions and treaties relating to purely private
law, which require for their enforcement no contact between the two
enemy powers and which did not involve the conduct of hostilities,
were maintained in full force. The basis for this point of view was the
fact that the rights of alien enemies, as provided in the Convention,
could not affect the fortunes of war; and even if they did, it would
depend upon the government to see that the beneficiaries of the Convention committed no hostile act. This decision was, therefore, in
strict accord with the American doctrine.23 But on the other hand, the
N.W. 13 (1929); Hempel v. Weedin, (D.C. Wash. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 949; Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); In re Meyer's Estate, (Cal. 1951) 238 P. (2d) 597, 46 AM.,
J. brr. L. 573 (1952).
19 Aix, 8 Dec. 1858, (Isnard Blanc v. Pezzales) S. 1859.2.606. Note that in Germany, if a treaty has been abrogated by war, its provisions still remain in force in the
body of the domestic law; 26 Oct. 1914, ENTsCHEIDtJNGBN DES RmcasGERICB:I'S IN Zivn.SACIIEN (neue Folge), vol. 85, p. 374 (1915).
20 Convention of June 3, 1930, between France and Italy, JoUBNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, 20 Jan. 1935.
2 1 Inferior court decisions-for the abrogation of the treaty; Justice de Paix, Marseille,
5th canton, 26 Oct. 1943, Gazette du Palais, supplement provisoire, Nov. 1943, p. 170;
Tno. civ. Toulouse, referes, 18 Nov. 1943, Gazette du Palais, 14 Dec. 1943. For the
maintenance in force of the treaty: Trib. Civ. Caen, 9 April 1941, Gazette du Palais, 29
May 1941; Trib. Civ. Marseille, 26 Oct. 1943, Gazette du Palais, Supplement provisoire,
Nov. 1943, p. 169. The Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court of France, is divided for
practical purposes into chambers which specialize in the different branches of the law.
22 Bussi v. Menetti, 5 Nov. 1943, Dalloz Critique, 1944, p. 84 and notes; Basdevant,
Dalloz Analytique, 1944, p. 109, S. 1945.1.98.
23 In re Meyer's Estate, (Cal. 1951) 238 P. (2d) 597, 46 AM.. J. brr. L. 573 (1952).
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"Chambre Civile" dealing with the same question and the same convention, reached the opposite result, holding that ~ar annuls treaties
and conventions, even those concerning private rights. This decision
was based upon the ground that these treaties and conventions were
entered into in consideration -of peacetime intercourse. The declaration of war by Italy was held to be incompatible with the maintenance
of obligations contracted by the French Government in view of a legal
status favorable to peacetime relations only.24
These opposing views expressed by the two most important chambers of the Court of Cassation had to be clarified in order to determine
the matter definitely. In 1949 the Court, all chambers sitting together,
decided again upon the question of the effect of war upon treaties in
the famous decision of Lovera v. Rinaldi,25 which was also a case
involving the Franco-Italian Convention. The decision agreed with
the judgment of the "Chambre Civile," and the Court again held
that war abrogated treaties and conventions relating to any subject
matter, because these conventions and treaties were concluded only in
the light of peacetime relations. Therefore, it is now clear that in
France war abrogates any kind of treaty, except presumably those
which are concluded especially in anticipation of possible war or
expressly providing that the conditions remain in existence during war.
One could say that Lovera v. Rinaldi26 is in accord with those American
decisions which hold that treaties of amity fall, as the Convention was
designed to promote relations of harmony between the two nations.
On the other hand, it was a convention which had the same character
as the treaties which provide for the giving to citizens and subjects of
one of the high contracting parties the powers to remain and to hold
and transmit land in the territory of the other,27 and furthermore the
decision spoke of conventions and treaties "du droit prive ... ," i.e.,
relating to private rights.
Cass. Civ., IO Feb. 1948, Dalloz 1948.1.193; S. 1948.1.49, note by J. P. Niboyet.
22 June 1949, S. 1949.1.161, note by J. P. Niboyet. When the Court of
Cassation sits with all its Chambers together, this indicates that a very important decision will
be rendered which will fuc definitively the law on a particular point. The case may be stated
brieHy as follows: After the war an Italian tenant sought through the appropriate French
court a renewal of a lease of land, claiming the benefit of certain French legislation concerning renewal of leases. This legislation was not designed to apply to resident aliens, but
the Italian tenant contended that he was entitled to its application by virtue of the
Franco-Italian convention of 1930; this was denied by the Court. For a report of the
case, see 43 AM. J. Torr. L. 819 (1949).
26 s. 1949.1.161.
27 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); In re Meyer's Estate, (Cal. 1951) 238 P.
(2d) 597; State ex rel. Miner v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 P. 158 (1926); Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920) cert. den. 254 U.S. 643.
24

25 Cass.,
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The reasoning of the Court was that treaties relating to private
rights as well as public matters are limited to times of peace, because
they cannot be otherwise interpreted. It is impossible to imagine that
two countries which are fighting each other can be considered as willing
to assure their respective nationals the advantages of peacetime relations. Also in view of the fact that modern wars are "total wars," it
would be impossible for belligerents to observe their obligations.28
Therefore, here is a decision in complete opposition to the American
position.
If the question comes before the International Court of Justice,
it is likely that it would be decided in the manner followed by the
French courts. In the £.rst place, there is no international law rule
on the subject which can be invoked against such a solution. Moreover,
since the entry into force of the peace treaty with Italy, this latter
treaty became the only source of law available to resolve the issue.
Article 44 of the peace treaty seems to approve the principle that war
puts an end to bilateral treaties and that only those treaties are maintained or put back into force which have been the subject of notification by the French Government to the Italian Government; no such
notification had been given here.29 But even over this point American
courts have evidenced disagreement. In In re Meyer's Estate30 the Cali28 Treaties, however, may stipulate whether they are to remain in force or be suspended
or terminated by the outbreak of war between the parties. See B1sHOP, lm:BRNATIONAL
LAw, c. VII, p. 70 (1951); also art. 35 of draft convention on treaties, 29 AM. J. INT. L'.,
Supp. 1183 (1935). See also in this connection M. Brandon and A. Leriche, "Suspension
of Rights and Obligations under Multilateral Conventions between Opposing Belligerents
on Account of War,'' 46 AM. J. INT. L. 532 (1952).
29 "I. Each Allied or Associated Power will notify Italy, within a period of six
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty which of its prewar bilateral
treaties with Italy it desires to keep in force or revive. Any provisions not in conformity
with the present Treaty shall, however, be deleted from the above mentioned treaties.
"2. All such treaties so notified shall be registered with the Secretariat of the
United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
"3. All such treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated." February 10,
1947, 49 United Nations Treaty Series No. 747.
However, a comparison of that art. 44 with art. 289 of the Treaty of Versailles may
lead to a different construction. The Treaty with Italy says that "all such treaties not so
notified shall be regarded as abrogated," whereas in the Treaty of Versailles it was said,
"All the other treaties [not so notified] shall remain abrogated." It can therefore be
argued that because of the particular wording of art. 44, a treaty is not automatically abrogated by war. Furthermore, in art. 44 it is said that each Allied or Associated power will
notify which treaty it desires to keep in force or revive. The use of "keep in forcd' could
also be interpreted in the sense of non-abrogation of treaties by war. On the other hand,
the Treaty of Versailles only uses the words "wishes to revive,'' the words "to keep in
force" being left out. This would leave no doubt that under the Treaty of Versailles,
treaties were automatically abrogated by war and that only those treaties and conventions
which became the subject of a notification were to be revived.
so (Cal. 1951) 238 P. (2d) 597.
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fornia courts in interpreting an almost similar provision of the Treaty
of Versailles31 went so far as to say that the provision was never
intended to apply to treaties which were not terminated by war, thus
being in complete opposition to the interpretation of that provision
by the State Department.32
It is incontestable that the French decision falls within the trend
of authority and most nearly accords with international law and the
facts of modern warfare. At a time when wars have touched upon
every facet of society, questioning the whole o.rder of things-especially
when the belligerents have two opposite conceptions of life one of
which is incompatible with the other-it is inconceivable that one
country would wish to confer the advantages of peace upon the other
in time of war, even though those advantages concerned private rights.
When peace returns, it will be time to set up a new set of treaty
agreements.
Also, as a practical factor, it seems desirable to have these conventions or treaties terminate in order to adapt them to new situations which
have resulted from the war. The American line of decisions is an
essentially generous one and has appealed to many foreign courts and
writers. However, it does not seem to take into consideration the
modern nature of war and it also seems to forget that modern wars
are as much supported by the civilian population as by the armed
forces. It thus becomes necessary to protect ordinary citizens in the
conduct of their affairs against alien enemies. Mr. Politis33 had based
his interpretation of the American decisions on the assumption of a
supposed progress of international customs and laws of warfare, presuming war to be only a struggle between organized forces of different
31 Article 289 of part X of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 provides that "each of the
Allied or Associated Powers, being guided by the general principles or special provisions
qf the present Treaty shall notify to Germany the bilateral treaties or conventions which
such Allied or Associated Power wishes to revive with Germany. • . • A period of six
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty is allowed to the Allied and
Associated Powers within which to make the notification. Only those bilateral treaties
and conventions which have been the subject of such a notification shall b~ revived between
the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany; all the others are and shall remain abrogated." United States Treaty Series No. 658, p. 64 (emphasis supplied).
32 Although the United States did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of
Berlin of August 25, 1921 between the United States and Germany provided that the
United States should have "all the rights and advantages stipulated" for its benefit in the
Treaty of Versailles and particularly in certain parts thereof including Part X. United States
Treaty Series, No. 658, 42 Stat. L., 1939.
The United States did not make any notification with respect to the treaty concerned
in the In re Meyer's decision. See 5 HAcxwonTH, Th:GEST OF !NTERNATIONAL LAw 386388, as to the interpretation of art. 289 of the Treaty of Versailles by the State Department.
33See note 8 supra.

1953]

COMMENTS

573

states temporarily disturbing the international order without questioning it. The last two world wars have proved that assumption to be
erroneous.
Perhaps a practic~l intermediate solution should be found, as for
example the necessity of a public announcement that the treaty or convention is abrogated. This would put an end to any confusion on the
matter and would have the advantage of preserving the solutions
followed in different countries. Also a declaration to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations could effect such a denunciation. If
this could be done, a simple manifestation of the intention of the co~tracting parties would be deemed to put an end to treaty obligations.

J. G. Castel

